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 It can be quite jarring when we encounter someone with beliefs radically divergent from 
our own, especially when they are invective or pernicious. Worse still is the experience of 
encountering one so confident in their convictions that they doggedly refuse to provide any 
justification for their claims or engage in any sort of deliberation about them. When someone 
loudly confronts you with the assertation that modern medicine is made up of a series of 
malicious lies perpetuated by bad actors, you may step away from the experience not only with 
the conviction that this person is deeply misguided, but that they are potentially harmful to those 
around them. You may marvel at the fact that in a world of readily available and widely 
circulated evidence to the contrary, this person has maintained such wildly fanatical beliefs 
against all odds. You may also wonder what exactly is wrong with such a state of affairs, and 
who is to blame for it. Are such people all malignant extremists with some sort of vendetta 
against truth, or are they a victim of some wrongdoing? Should you approach them with 
indignation or pity? What has gone wrong here? 
 I have been deeply troubled by such questions. Beliefs occupy a powerful role in all 
aspects of our lives and are essential to many of the most impactful realms of human activity. All 
intellectual, political, and social activity relies on the stable function of our belief practices, and 
our everyday experience certainly reflects this. At times, we find it fitting to hold people 
responsible for the beliefs they develop, and if these beliefs are in some way bad or incorrect, to 
blame them for them. However, this is in tension with the popular sentiment that opinions are 
open to (mostly) free adoption and expression. So long as your beliefs do not directly harm 
someone (e.g. forms of violent bigotry), it does not seem fit to vocally censure or punish a 
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stranger for the beliefs they hold, even if they are completely unfounded or somewhat 
problematic- “that’s just my opinion” is usually a viable defense. 
 These observations led me to question our ordinary belief practice, and to attempt to find 
some consistency within it and find out what an ideal belief practice should look like. If an 
unfounded belief is not directly harmful, can we hold someone responsible for adopting it? Can 
we blame them for it? If so, in virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? Which ones can 
we be blamed for adopting? Above all, how can we be good believers, how can we be 
responsible believers? 
 In this work I will attempt to answer each of these questions in the order that I have 
presented them. I will begin with a chapter on doxastic responsibility (that is, responsibility for 
our beliefs). Following accounts by Angela Smith and Robert Carry Osborne, I will conclude 
that we are in fact responsible for the extreme majority of our beliefs, including those over which 
we exercise little to no control. I will then follow this chapter with one on doxastic blame, 
arguing that blame directed at beliefs is a species of protest aimed at the violation of epistemic 
norms. I will argue that such protest is grounded and legitimized by the liability to harm that 
epistemically flawed beliefs (even those which are not apparently malignant) expose those 
around us to. I will conclude that chapter by arguing that unlike doxastic responsibility, doxastic 
blame is indeed mitigated by the amount of control we have over the development and 
maintenance of our blameworthy beliefs. 
 In the final two chapters, I will apply these analyses of responsibility and blame to 
questions regarding when we are blameworthy for our beliefs, and how we can minimize such 
blameworthiness. Put differently, these chapters will consider what obligations we have as 
believers, and how we can best fulfill them (i.e. how we can be responsible believers). I will 
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argue that all beliefs which we can be blamed for developing result from forms of epistemic 
akrasia or carelessness. From this observation, I will conclude that the best means available to us 
to become responsible believers is to cultivate a virtue of epistemic conscientiousness, that is, 
care applied to our epistemic activities which prioritizes the truth over all other interests. 
 In the course of these chapters, I build on the work of Rik Peels and Robert Carry 
Osborne. Peels has offered an account of responsible belief which answers the questions above 
in a way I found mostly satisfactory. In a recent paper, Osborne offers an account of doxastic 
responsibility based heavily on the intuition that we are social creatures who rely on one another 
to be reliable trackers of information. When we fail to do so, we put others around us at risk of 
(sometimes) serious harms; Osborne legitimizes near universal responsibility for beliefs upon 
this intuition.  
 Osborne’s intuition that our interpersonal status is the grounding for many of our 
responsibilities and obligations is one which I think cannot be understated, and one which has 
not received adequate treatment in the recent literature. Many of my conclusions in this work 
will be in some way based upon or motivated by this fact. Peels’ account, while generally 
adequate in its approach, fails to properly appreciate this interpersonal dimension of our doxastic 
lives. Accordingly, I describe the account offered below as a synthesis of these accounts. 
 An important note should be made about the scope of this work. In attempting to figure 
out which beliefs we can be blamed for holding, I will not be considering how we should go 
about regulating such beliefs in practice. The intersection between respect for the autonomy of 
others and instituting a more ideal belief practice is a challenging area, and one I have neither the 
space nor the knowledge to treat properly. I will have little to nothing to say about how we 
should handle encountering such beliefs in others. Instead, I will say much about which beliefs 
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are blameworthy, why we can be blamed for them, and how we can navigate our own doxastic 
lives in a way that minimizes such blame. In doing so, I hope to provide a means by which we 






















1. Doxastic Responsibility 
 Before we consider how one believes responsibly, we will have to consider what it means 
to be responsible for a belief. Is it appropriate to attribute responsibility to beliefs, and if so what 
conditions must hold in order to do so? Does doxastic responsibility (that is, responsibility for 
beliefs) come in degrees, and does it ever disappear entirely? To answer such questions, in this 
chapter I will attempt to provide an account of doxastic responsibility. I will then use that 
account to articulate the necessary conditions for doxastic responsibility, and when it is 
diminished or heightened. 
Many accounts of responsibility (doxastic or otherwise) require that an agent have some 
form of control over a belief in order to be responsible for it, following the principle “ought-
implies-can.” I will spend much of this chapter arguing to the contrary that control is not 
requisite for doxastic responsibility. Instead, following accounts given by Angela Smith and 
Robert Carry Osborne I will argue that doxastic responsibility should be regarded as a form of 
answerability which is independent of control. I will first consider arguments which require 
varying forms of control for doxastic responsibility. After advancing my objections to these 
accounts, I will continue to consider accounts on which doxastic responsibility does not require 
control. I will conclude by endorsing an account recently provided by Robert Carry Osborne, 
which ultimately grounds doxastic responsibility in the potential beliefs have to harm others in 
one’s epistemic community.  
Doxastic Responsibility and Control 
 For the sake of clarity, I will begin with a definition of responsibility simpliciter 
borrowed from Rik Peels. To say that an agent is responsible for an act or belief is to say that it is 
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appropriate to normatively evaluate them for that act or belief.1 In considering accounts which 
require control for doxastic responsibility, I will begin with two well-known characterizations of 
control over beliefs. As originally distinguished by William Alston, direct control involves an 
agent coming to believe that p by an act of will while indirect control involves an agent 
executing action(s) that bring it about that they believe that p.2  
Those who claim we have direct control occupy the more extreme position, which entails 
that we are at least sometimes capable of confronting a given proposition p and simply deciding 
to believe p or ~p. With clear cut cases, direct control is fairly easily refuted. Alston provides a 
now famous counterexample to such claims, claiming that one cannot for an arbitrarily large sum 
of money believe that the U.S is still a colony of Great Britain.3 One may be able to bring it 
about that I have such a belief through a rigorous project of self-deception in order to obtain the 
money, but one cannot simply will that they have this belief for such prudential reasons.4  
 The natural move for an advocate of direct control here is simply to limit the scope of 
directly controllable beliefs to those which are not obviously true or false. Neil Levy attempts to 
undermine this strategy by considering instances where our evidence weighs approximately 
equally for competing beliefs. He argues that in such instances we are equally powerless to 
directly choose between such competing beliefs.5 Instead, we will often simply assume one 
belief or the other out of necessity. In cases where we end up favoring one belief over the other, 
Levy argues that we never directly decide upon one. Instead we first perform necessary acts as 
dismissing our doubts or evidence, which in turn bring it about that we believe.6 This precludes 
 
1 Rik Peels,  
2 William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justifucation,” Philosophical Perspectives 2, (1988): 
260. 
3 Alston, 263. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Levy, 137. 
6 Levy, 138. 
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the possibility of direct control over such equally supported beliefs, and instead suggests that we 
utilize indirect control in such cases. 
 Given such refutations, one might regard indirect control as a more plausible alternative. 
Advocates of indirect doxastic control maintain that we can come to develop a belief that p 
through an action or series of actions. This is often analogized to other states of affairs we are 
responsible for maintaining through some series of practical actions. I am responsible for how 
long and unkempt my hair is despite the fact that I cannot will that it be neat and trimmed on a 
whim; still, I can schedule an appointment at the barber or cut and comb it myself. 
 Many find this form of control over our beliefs plausible, and I am inclined to agree. This 
category of belief could include such projects as intentional acts of self-deception, or more 
mundane cases of impulsive or biased thinking: I may want to believe that materialism is true 
and in order to do so seek out especially well formulated arguments for it and make sure I 
encounter only weak objections against it.  
 However, few find this a convincing form of control on which to ground doxastic 
responsibility. Say that in a local election for dairy inspector I believe candidate A is more 
aligned with my interests than candidate B. If doxastic responsibility is grounded in indirect 
control, then it seems I am responsible for my false hope in A because I failed to recognize B 
early on and bring it about that I believe she better represents my interests, perhaps by shutting 
myself off from any and all evidence to the contrary. Such responsibility does not seem 
instructive in any epistemically appealing way, and the reasons one might have for choosing one 
belief early on rather than another remain mysterious. Alston articulates this point well: “To try 
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to get oneself to believe that p, prior to being in a good position to tell whether p is true or not, is 
not a procedure to be commended from the epistemic standpoint.”7  
Even if one admits that such projects may sometimes be a clearly preferred course of 
action for moral or prudential reasons, such cases are certainly the exception and cannot serve as 
general ground for doxastic responsibility. The fact that I am in principle capable of indirectly 
arriving at beliefs by choice thus seems unrelated to any responsibility we normally ascribe to 
beliefs.  
The common thread between these direct and indirect varieties of control is their 
directedness towards a specific belief that p. I would locate the weakness of the above accounts 
in this intentionality. To put it more directly, I would argue that doxastic responsibility cannot be 
grounded in our ability to intentionally develop a specific belief. Still, this does not exhaust the 
options available for doxastic responsibility based on doxastic control. For one can still 
intentionally impact the way they acquire beliefs without intentionally acquiring any specific 
beliefs. A much stronger position along these lines has been extensively developed by Rik Peels.  
As above, Peels argues that while we cannot intentionally direct ourselves towards any 
given belief, we still exert control over the beliefs we acquire through what he calls indirect 
influence. More rigorously, Peels says that we have this sort of influence over belief when we 
cannot intentionally believe that p, but we can intentionally perform an action that determines 
whether we believe that p.8 Say for example I currently believe that human hearing does not 
detect frequencies greater than 20kHz. I could seek out and listen to a 21kHz tone to test my 
belief; should I hear it, I would reject my original belief. Therefore, there are actions I could 
 
7 Alston, 273. 
8 Peels, 90. 
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voluntarily perform that would determine whether I believe p or ~p without intending to believe 
either.  
Peels argues that this indirect influence is generative of what he calls “intellectual 
obligations.” One has an intellectual obligation to perform an action if failure to perform that 
action will lead one to acquire beliefs that are in some way bad, whether objectively or 
subjectively. In other words, if one has a belief when they should not, they have at some point 
violated an intellectual obligation.9 
With this account, Peels capably avoids requiring the intentionality I noted was a 
weakness in the above views built upon indirect and direct control. However, I do not think this 
makes his account wholly secure. When we assign responsibility to someone because their 
actions have led to some bad outcome, we generally set some limit on how far such 
responsibility can extend. If I cut down a tree on someone else’s property, I am responsible for a 
number of things: property damage, trespassing, etc. Still, I am not responsible for every bad 
outcome that is causally linked to my vandalistic behavior. I could reasonably be expected to 
appreciate that removing that tree decreased the property value, deprived the owner of its shade, 
and perhaps even some fruit. Given this, it seems abundantly clear that I am responsible for such 
losses. However, nobody could reasonably hold me responsible if the owner developed 
melanoma thirty years later from increased sun exposure; this remains true even if had the tree 
remained standing he would have remained healthy. Likewise, I am not responsible for 
preventing his car from being totaled even if for a certainty the tree would have fell on his car in 
a storm that very week had it remained standing.  
 
9 Peels, 99. 
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Likewise, in the realm of belief it seems our responsibility for having good or bad beliefs 
does not ultimately bottom out in some failure to meet our intellectual obligations. This remains 
true even if (as Peels requires) fulfilling those obligations would unequivocally have avoided 
acquiring that belief. Just as one cannot always anticipate the outcome of some action, epistemic 
failings often have unexpected consequences. One could easily violate some intellectual 
obligation end up in a better position practically, morally, or even epistemically just by 
circumstance. Or vice-versa, one could fulfill their intellectual obligations with superhuman 
reliability and still end up with beliefs that are in some way bad. What I hope to emphasize with 
such examples is the fact that intentionally commiting some act does not always render one 
responsible for its outcome. 
Peels attempts to meet this objection of “doxastic luck” with a caveat to his original 
formulation of intellectual obligations: responsibility does not apply in cases where the belief 
formation is accidental to their fulfillment or violation of intellectual obligations.10 While this 
does make Peels’ account extensionally appropriate, it is hard not to see it as ad hoc. Given his 
account, Peels is naturally concerned with retaining the idea that our resourcefulness as epistemic 
agents determines our quality as believers; this position becomes hard to maintain if it seems that 
a not insignificant portion of our beliefs are acquired not as a result of the vicissitudes of fate. 
Doxastic Responsibility without Control 
 In the above section, I have argued extensively against grounding doxastic responsibility 
in different forms of control. To reiterate, I do think that we are able to intentionally develop 
beliefs by the indirect process described above (though it is very likely inadvisable to do so). I 
also think that the indirect influences Peels grounds doxastic responsibility in are both in our 
 
10 Peels, 217. 
Conk 12 
control and massively shape which beliefs we form and how we are evaluated for forming them. 
However, if one finds the above issues with these control-based accounts compelling, they 
should not think that any of these accounts provide a compelling ground on which to base 
doxastic responsibility.  
The motivation for requiring control for responsibility is intuitive; it seems almost 
oppressive to hold someone responsible for states of affairs they have no capacity to prevent. For 
this reason, there is a high burden for those who want to attribute responsibility to believers 
regardless of their control over their beliefs. I will consider two such analyses of responsible 
belief offered by Angela Smith and Robert Carry Osborne. By outlining these accounts, I hope to 
demonstrate that for many states of affairs we retain responsibility despite a total lack of control. 
Smith’s account of responsibility is built upon an analysis of responsibility as 
answerability. Smith argues that many of our attitudes (not just beliefs) are essentially 
evaluative: they reveal “what we judge to be of value, importance, or significance.”11 Smith 
concludes that if a mental activity is rationally connected to some such evaluation, one can 
reasonably be asked to acknowledge and defend the judgements it implies; reasons can be 
demanded as to why they hold the views indicated by their mental attitude.12 For Smith, being 
the appropriate target of these reasonable demands (i.e. being answerable for these mental 
activities) is a form of responsibility.13  
One may worry that this contradicts my provided definition of responsibility (i.e. 
responsibility consists in being the target of appropriate normative evaluations). If I have a 
mental attitude of malice, that attitude is rationally connected to the commitment that the object 
 
11 Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (no.2), 251. 
12 Smith, 256.  
13 Smith, 270 
Conk 13 
of my malice deserves to suffer some evil. This commitment can be normatively evaluated; in 
most contexts it will be regarded as reprehensible. It is also clear that beliefs are indicative of our 
evaluations and commitments, and thus Smith’s account extends to beliefs.  
Note that this account  of responsibility for attitudes does not require voluntary control. 
Voluntary control is not necessary for answerability, even in cases where there is no voluntary 
action I could have committed or not committed to avoid acquiring a certain mental attitude.14 In 
the above example of malice, I am not made evaluable in light of some decision I made in the 
past that set me to developing a malicious attitude; I am evaluable based on the content of the 
attitude my malice reveals.  
However, there is one remaining worry with Smith’s account and others like it. While it 
may be true that one can appropriately ask for a justification for someone else’s belief (or some 
other mental attitude), there does not seem to be any reason why this represents a demand with 
normative force. Robert Carry Osborne raises this worry “Why might I owe it to you to actually 
provide my reasons if you demand them? Why should it matter to you what I believe, and what 
my reasons are?”15 Put another way, Smith does not seem to offer with her account a reason why 
such demands should actually be met.  
Osborne argues that in the realm of belief we are often obligated to justify and defend our 
beliefs. This is because the information we transmit as believers is critical to various social 
projects which depend upon the reliable transmission of information.16 As a result, if we fail to 
(?) fulfill our role as information tracking and transmitting beings poorly, great epistemic and 
 
14 Smith, 263. 
15 Robert Carry Osborne, “A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of 
responsibility for belief,” Synthese (2020), 9. 
16 Osborne, 11.  
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practical harms can result.17 Thus, in Osborne’s account we find an alternative grounding for 
answerability: believers are subject to normative evaluation through the demands of harm-
avoidance.18 One cannot simply refuse to participate in the practice of justifying and defending 
their beliefs without putting others at risk. 
Beyond this difference in grounding, Osborne’s account of doxastic responsibility is 
similar  to Smith’s account. Like Smith, Osborne regards doxastic responsibility as a form of 
answerability. Osborne also notes that this notion of answerability does not require the ability to 
change our beliefs.19 Osborne offers his “Rational Situatedness Condition” (RSC) as a slightly 
tweaked form of Smith’s account, where one is answerable for holding a belief iff the belief is 
“rationally linked to their evaluative judgements, assessments, or dispositions towards activities 
like reasoning themselves that have not been implanted in ways that bypass or usurp her rational 
capacities.”20 This final caveat represents the only significant difference between Osborne and 
Smith’s accounts. With it, Osborne attempts to extend answerability to beliefs which one initially 
acquired in ways that usurp their rational capacities (e.g. implanted by a brain surgeon or 
hypnotist) but still reveal their evaluative judgements, etc.21 Thus, on his account we can be 
responsible for such beliefs (while they are excluded by Smith’s). 
The Limits of Doxastic Responsibility 
 I’ll now take stock. Given that he does not locate doxastic responsibility in some form of 
voluntary control, and improves upon Smith’s otherwise convincing account, I find Osborne’s 
account  preferrable  over others discussed here. I will thus regard doxastic responsibility as a 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Osborne, 12. 
19 Osborne, 8. 
20 Osborne, 7. 
21 Osborne, 8. 
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form of answerability for beliefs: we are responsible for beliefs insofar as we are the target of 
reasonable demands to justify them. We are in turn obligated to respond to these demands in 
virtue of our membership in a wider epistemic community, as refusal to participate in a 
responsible epistemic practice puts members of our epistemic community at risk. If we accept 
this account, we are in a position to answer the questions originally posed at the start of this 
chapter. Namely, what must be true in order for one to be responsible for a belief? Does doxastic 
responsibility come in degrees, and does it ever disappear entirely? 
 The first question has already been rigorously answered by Osborne’s formulation of 
RSC. One is answerable (and thus responsible) for any belief which is linked to one’s evaluative 
judgements, assessments, etc. The question of whether responsibility is binary or comes in 
degrees much more interesting, and much less clear. I see two possible answers given the 
contents of the above accounts. We could regard responsibility as a purely binary state. If one is 
at all answerable for a belief according to RSC, they are responsible for it. If they are not 
answerable, then they have no responsibility for such beliefs. Alternatively, we could admit of 
degrees in responsibility. We could apply a level of salience to responsibility, where one can be 
somewhere between trivially and significantly responsible for a given belief. I think the latter is 
more plausible, as we do not seem to regard ourselves as having equal responsibility for every 
belief. 
The above accounts lend themselves easily to this concept. Some of the evaluative 
commitments/judgements noted by Smith or Osborne are more significant than others. If one of 
my mental attitudes or beliefs is rationally connected to my evaluative judgement that the work 
of dog surfing instructors is useless, I may be trivially answerable for that belief. In other words, 
I’m surely responsible for it, but my lack of appreciation for such an obscure profession is not 
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very morally significant. On the other hand, I would be significantly responsible if I believed that 
natural disasters are sent by Neptune as a means of selectively removing sinful populations from 
the world. The evaluative commitments connected to such a belief have much more significance 
than the previous example: they contain the judgement that certain people groups are 
cumulatively worse than others, and that in virtue of this they deserve death.  
I have used highly reprehensible examples here to make my point, but keep in mind that 
attributions of responsibility are not exclusive to or constituted by blameworthiness. To say that 
someone is more responsible for holding one belief than another is to say that the moral stakes 
are raised. Perhaps Osborne would want to extend this further and argue that doxastic 
responsibility increases with the magnitude of potential harm. 
 The second question concerns whether we can have beliefs for which we are not 
responsible. While answerability requires that a belief be rationally connected to one’s evaluative 
judgements, it does not seem to be a conceptual necessity that beliefs are always connected in 
this way. So, it seems plausible that we could hold some beliefs without being answerable for 
them. I imagine beliefs similar (but not identical) to Peels’ so called dormant beliefs can serve as 
an example of this. Peels defines dormant beliefs as those beliefs one has had it the past but has 
not considered for some time. If however one were asked whether they believe that p when they 
believe it dormantly, they would affirm that they believe that p.22  
One could for example form a belief that p which is at one time rationally connected to 
their evaluative judgements. However, over time their evaluative judgements can independently 
change, while they still by habit either truly believe that p or merely respond that they believe 
that p when asked.23 If at some later point such beliefs bear no relation to their evaluative 
 
22 Peels, 37. 
23 Whether or not such responses are an instance of belief may not be clear.  
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judgements and they have yet to realize this, they may not be responsible for believing that p.24 
The less realistic cases of belief implantation (e.g. through consuming belief inducing pills or 
hypnotism) also provide examples of belief without responsibility. Nevertheless, responsibility is 
only eliminated for these beliefs if they bear no relation to the believer’s evaluative judgements.  
A natural objection against this and other views grounded in answerability is that they 
ascribe responsibility to far too many beliefs. Beyond the two exceptions noted above, there are 
very few beliefs for which we are not answerable (and thus responsible). Some will take issue 
with the fact that such accounts make responsibility for beliefs nearly inescapable, worrying that 
such stringent responsibility is unfair. Smith counters this sentiment well by noting that “being 
held responsible is as much a privilege as it is a burden.”25 It must be remarked that 
responsibility is not some dogged judgement we should all want to escape; instead it is a mark of 
respect and recognition of us as capable epistemic agents within our larger epistemic community. 
Conclusion 
I do not think that control over our beliefs is an appropriate ground for doxastic 
responsibility. Instead, I characterize doxastic responsibility as a form of answerability: we are 
subject as believers to reasonable demands for justification of our beliefs so long as they are 
rationally connected to our evaluative commitments. These normative demands are given force 
by the potential they have to harm others in our epistemic community if not justified. Thus, while 
our responsibility for beliefs comes in varying degrees based on the normative impact they have, 
there are very few beliefs for which we lack responsibility altogether. 
 
 
24 Though they may be responsible for not duly reflecting on whether the belief that p was truly aligned with their 
values. 
25 Smith, 269. 
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2. Doxastic Blame 
 Having argued above for a notion of doxastic responsibility as answerability, in this 
chapter I will begin to expand upon this claim. Above, I used Peels’ definition of responsibility 
simpliciter as the state of being appropriately liable to normative evaluations. Likewise, here I 
will use Peels’ definitions of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness as the states of being 
appropriately liable to positive and negative normative evaluations respectively.26 Here I am only 
concerned with doxastic blame, for three reasons. First, our evaluative practices concerning 
beliefs are much more interesting and difficult in the case of blame than in the case of praise or 
neutral appraisal. Second, a refined account of doxastic blame is also crucial for answering 
certain questions related to responsible belief practices, as I hope to demonstrate in subsequent 
chapters. Finally, given that praise and blame are conceptually similar, much of what is said here 
concerning blame is still applicable to praise, mutatis mutandis.  
 In my analysis of doxastic blame, I will begin by emphasizing a distinction between the 
evaluation of one as blameworthy and blaming proper. These are distinguished by the fact that 
judging one blameworthy is necessary but not sufficient for blaming, which is an act rather than 
a judgement.27 A large part of this section will concern what must be added on top of judging 
that one is blameworthy to yield an act of blaming. Moreover, some have argued that blame in 
the doxastic realm cannot extend beyond the mere observation that one is blameworthy for a 
particular belief or set of beliefs. I will argue that on the contrary blame in the doxastic realm can 
and does extend beyond the mere evaluation that one is blameworthy for their beliefs, by 
appealing once more to Osborne’s observation that harms resulting from faulty beliefs endanger 
 
26 Rik Peels, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
11. 
27 Angela Smith, “Moral Blame and Moral Protest,” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. D. Justin Coates and Neal 
A. Tognazzini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 27. 
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one’s epistemic community. These harms ground and legitimize practices of doxastic blame 
which extend beyond mere evaluation. I conclude by considering how factors such as degrees of 
harms and the believer’s control raise or lower the blame we assign to those who hold particular 
beliefs. 
Varieties of Blame  
In his influential essay “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson noted a tension 
between different attitudes we can adopt interpersonal interactions. He distinguishes what he 
called the “objective stance” from our normal attitudinal practices where we hold each other 
responsible, reacting to each other with attitudes such  as resentment or gratitude.28 I will refer to 
the latter category as the “participant stance.” The objective stance represents a policy according 
to which one treats others essentially as objects or obstacles to be navigated, accounted for, or 
modified.29 Taking an objective stance, I might navigate interpersonal interactions by asking how 
I should treat my target to achieve my own ends (or those of society at large) in the most 
effective way possible. The participant stance involves some manner of response which engages 
with one’s target on a morally active level, i.e. by treating them as a moral agent, with all the 
expectations and entitlements which that entails. Often this involves what Strawson calls 
“reactive attitudes.” When confronted by someone’s moral failings, attitudes like blame, anger, 
or shame in response would be examples of these.  
Strawson argues that we cannot conceive of human relations with a purely objective 
stance and must engage in attitudes belonging to the participant class when we blame others. 
Since Strawson’s essay however, this distinction between the objective and participant stances 
 
28 P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, (London: Methuen, 
1974), 9.  
29 Ibid. 
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has been utilized extensively in literature on blame, and a tension has arisen between competing 
camps. Some agree with Strawson that blame cannot be divorced from such participant attitudes 
as anger and resentment, while others argue that such attitudes are not necessary for blame.  
 Andrea Westlund provides an analysis of blame which affords an apt diagnosis for such 
debates. Westlund bases her diagnosis on the observation that we engage in many distinct but 
related speech acts when we use the word “blame” in everyday contexts. More rigorously, 
Westlund notes that blame has a “behabitive” sense when it exhibits attitudes and feelings, 
“verdictive” sense when one delivers a (negative) judgement about behavior, and a “exercitive” 
sense when it exercises some power of the blamer (e.g. asserting a claim, imposing an obligation, 
etc.).30  
So, we can mean a variety of things when we say that we blame someone, from 
expressing our anger at another’s moral failing to demanding recompense or seeking advice. I 
would argue that while some of these instances of blaming require Strawson’s participant 
attitudes, for others (such as the exercitive) such attitudes are not necessary.31 Accordingly, I 
claim that we could truly blame someone and remain totally dispassionate when evaluating the 
normative content of their acts. Many will not be convinced of the possibility of such 
dispassionate evaluative blame. One could argue to the contrary (as Strawson does) that some 
modicum of those interpersonal attitudes is necessary for blame regardless of how it is felt or 
expressed. In the absence of such attitudes, they would argue that we merely judge the targets of 
our evaluations; it is an overstatement to call such acts blaming.  
 
30 Andrea Westlund, “Answerability without Blame?” in Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility, eds. Katerina 
Hutchison, Catriona MacKenzie, and Marina Oshana, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 258. 
31 Jessica Brown also seems to be of this opinion, c.f. “Some of the reactive attitudes often associated with blame, 
such as resentment and guilt, don’t always seem appropriate in the case of blameworthy belief.” Jessica Brown, 
“What is Epistemic Blame?” Nous 54, no. 2 (2018), 390. 
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Angela Smith provides an account of moral blame which addresses such objections. 
According to Smith, while the relationship between blaming and such reactive attitudes is one of 
close association, it is not one of necessity.32 Smith supports this claim with abundant 
counterexamples of cases in which we clearly blame someone for their acts yet remain 
dispassionate: one relevant to this discussion is a persistently unreliable friend. After dozens of 
instances of a friend falling through, most of us will cease to feel any significant reaction to our 
friend’s lack of reliability, yet we can blame them all the same.  
So, instead of defining blame in terms of such reactive attitudes, Smith offers two 
alternative requirements for blame: the blamer must first believe that the object of their blame is 
blameworthy (that is, they must believe that negative normative evaluation is appropriate), and 
their blame must be an instance of moral protest against this object.33 By moral protest, Smith 
means one adjusting their “attitudes, intentions, and expectations” towards the person they blame 
as a way of seeking moral acknowledgement.34 A simple example of this may be seeking an 
apology from someone we blame for a morally reprehensible act. In such cases, our blame goes 
beyond merely judging that this person has done something wrong: we communicate that we 
have been wronged and seek an admission of that fact. Nevertheless, Smith does concede that 
arguments against her claim (i.e. arguments that reactive attitudes are necessary for blame) are 
not entirely unmotivated. Given the fact that the moral protest which is necessary for blame most 
commonly takes the form of such reactive attitudes, it is natural to conclude that the two are 
conceptually related.35  
 
32 Smith, 41. 
33 Smith, 43. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Smith, 41. 
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A further confusion results when one conflates finding blameworthy with genuine acts of 
blaming. To avoid this confusion, I will emphasize the distinction between the merely evaluative 
judgement that one is blameworthy and blame proper. The fact that one notices a failure to 
adhere to some relevant norm, whether that norm is epistemic, moral, or generated from some 
practice is not sufficient for blame. This is the mere judgement that the Strawsonian points to 
when objecting to the concept of dispassionate blame. Still, such judgements coupled with moral 
protest are sufficient for blame, regardless of whether such protest contains any negative reactive 
attitudes. 
Doxastic Blame 
 In discussing Strawson, Westlund, and Smith’s work, I have only considered blame in the 
moral realm. Given this background, I will now consider what is unique to blame in the doxastic 
realm. In doing so I hope to answer two questions: when can we blame someone for holding a 
belief, and on what grounds? It seems that Smith’s account could be easily transposed from the 
moral realm to the doxastic by changing the standards by which the object of one’s blame is 
judged. Rather than judging that someone has done something morally wrong and protesting 
their act, doxastic blame refers to the recognition and protest of someone violating an epistemic 
norm. Still, this sidesteps the issue of what exactly those epistemic norms are. Moreover, why we 
should be normatively blamed for our epistemic failings remains mysterious, especially if this 
blame can justify reactive attitudes (outrage at someone’s belief) or even punishment.  
To these ends, Conor McHugh’s analysis of the relation between truth and epistemic 
norms can be instructive. In his paper “The Truth Norm of Belief” McHugh argues that it is 
problematic to suggest that truth can serve as a grounding for doxastic norms. McHugh argues 
that truth cannot serve as the basis for general norms governing our beliefs, e.g. “one ought to 
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have true beliefs.”36 Instead, McHugh argues that truth can (and does) serve only as an 
evaluative norm of beliefs. More rigorously, beliefs are good doxastic attitudes if true and bad 
doxastic attitudes if false.37  
Without reiterating it in full here, McHugh bases his argument for this claim on the 
intuition that true beliefs are in some way correct, while false beliefs are in some way defective. 
So, the belief that my sister is honest may be independently good (e.g. practically or morally), 
but my holding this belief is better when it is true than when it is false. He also motivates his 
conclusion by noting that it explains many other epistemic norms; we adhere to norms such as 
withholding judgement when we have insufficient evidence because such norms are good means 
of maximizing the true beliefs we have. 
However, McHugh emphasizes that these evaluations can only apply to doxastic 
attitudes: we can only be evaluated in light of the truth or falsity of our beliefs qua believer, not 
simpliciter.38 So McHugh claims that in light of the truth, I can be evaluated as believing poorly 
if I come to the conclusion that the northern hemisphere experiences winter in July, but this is as 
far as any appropriate truth-based evaluation extends. This is especially troubling if applied to 
epistemic norms generally. One could similarly agree that those who formulate beliefs by 
irrational (e.g. unreliable) means should be evaluated as poor believers, but this is as far as any 
appropriate evaluation extends for such agents. 
In this restricted scope an important objection resurfaces: while such norms may be 
universally applicable to all of us qua believer, there is no rationale for why we are required to 
be good believers (e.g. given a truth norm, to have true beliefs). If none exists, only a trivial type 
 
36 Conor McHugh, “The Truth Norm of Belief,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93, (2012), 11.  
37 McHugh, 22.  
38 McHugh, 23. 
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of evaluative blame could exist in the doxastic realm. One could only blame someone qua 
believer for having a false (or unreliably generated) belief in the same way they would blame 
someone qua runner. That is, blame concerning one’s false belief would only amount to the 
charge that one was not adhering to the norms of the practice.  
To this objection I repeat Robert Osborne’s important insight from the previous chapter. 
We are obligated to be good believers in virtue of the potential harms we could cause by being 
poor epistemic agents.39 To use the above example, if I regularly run marathons for my own 
enjoyment and suddenly fail to finish one because I’ve stopped training, I cannot be blamed for 
running that race poorly except qua runner. But consider Pheidippides, the soldier who delivered 
messages from the Battle of Marathon for which the modern race is named. If he failed to run 
those extensive courses and deliver important information for the war effort, many more of his 
Greek countrymen would have died in battle. So not only could Pheidippides be blamed in virtue 
of being a poor runner if he collapsed one mile in, but he could also be blamed in virtue of 
failing his obligations as a soldier. The case is quite similar for all of us as epistemic agents, as 
others in our epistemic communities can be hurt, misled, and suffer losses if we fail to manage 
our beliefs responsibly.  
 With this in mind, we can now move on to answering the question of when doxastic 
blame is appropriate. If we deny McHugh’s argument and make the truth norm the basis for 
doxastic blame, it may seem that all false beliefs render their believer blameworthy insofar as 
they jeopardize others in the larger epistemic community. However, this claim seems 
implausibly radical. An account that regards all of us as perpetually blameworthy for our beliefs 
does not seem at all right. Nearly all of us hold false beliefs; if I myself could somehow empty 
 
39 Robert Carry Osborne, “A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of 
responsibility for belief,” Synthese (2020), 9. 
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the contents of my head and sort the false beliefs from the true, I’m not confident more than half 
would turn up in my favor. Thus, if I am to reject the conclusion that we are all perpetually 
blameworthy in virtue of having false beliefs, I must either provide expansive excusing 
conditions which mitigate our blame in most cases, or modify my concept of doxastic blame to 
include considerations beyond the effects one’s beliefs have on their epistemic community. 
I will go with the latter approach. My reason for doing this is stated well by Peels: 
excuses should not be sweeping conditions that apply to all universally and should be the 
exceptional situation instead of the norm.40 Moreover, taking beliefs themselves as the grounding 
of one’s blame would in an important sense miss one’s target. When we blame an agent, we do 
so not simply in virtue of some negative trait or circumstance, but because we believe they have 
brought about some ill through the violation of a relevant norm.41 Thus, I will identify 
blameworthy beliefs as those formed in violation of a relevant epistemic norm (without excuse). 
What these norms are will be explored in the next chapter.  
Nevertheless, while I still believe that epistemic harms ultimately ground doxastic blame, 
such blame is not the sort of condition we can apply to all universally without considering the 
context in which one develops a false belief. This is especially true since we are not always in a 
position to reliably gather true beliefs, nor are we always in a position to appreciate the proper 
way to devote our epistemic resources to optimize the outcome of our belief forming processes. 
In order to formulate an acceptable account of doxastic blame, this context dependence must be 
accounted for. In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider such context dependence. 
Degrees of Doxastic Blame 
 
40 Peels, 183. 
41 I am grateful to Dr. Karin Boxer for bringing this fact to my attention. 
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 I will first argue that how blameworthy one is for a particular belief is determined largely 
by just how significant that belief is and how dangerous holding it is to one’s epistemic 
community. I think this flows naturally from Osborne’s claim that doxastic responsibility is 
ultimately grounded in the potential for harms in one’s epistemic community, and also echoes 
my claim of variable responsibility from the previous chapter. Briefly restated, my argument for 
variable responsibility is as follows: if epistemic harms ground our normative evaluations of 
someone’s beliefs, surely the development of more consequential beliefs deserve more intense 
judgements. The case is no different for doxastic blame. 
 Some examples can help further this point. Imagine that I believe that the medulla 
oblongata is situated immediately behind the right eye socket. This belief is clearly false, but in 
my daily life I am fairly unlikely to cause significant harm by forming it. I might not find anyone 
who cares enough about neural anatomy to accept my false belief without verification, nor am I 
likely to perform brain surgery anytime soon. However, if a practicing neurosurgeon were to 
adopt this belief, they would be extremely blameworthy simply for forming and maintaining that 
belief in virtue of their profession; they could perhaps communicate it to surgeons in training or 
perform malpractice as a result. With this example I hope to have demonstrated that with the 
formation of the same belief, the appropriate amount of blame can shift wildly depending upon 
the position one is in to cause harm based upon that belief.42 
A potential objection to this claim is that the above example the additional blame is 
entirely a product of the professional role the neurosurgeon occupies. Instead, an account of 
doxastic blame should rely only on desiderata that apply universally and address us purely as 
believers. In replying to such an objection, I would first argue that no such account can track 
 
42 See Sanford Goldberg, “Should have known,” Synthese 194, (2017), 2863-2894 for more on the relation between 
such roles and doxastic obligations.  
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well with our actual practice of doxastic blame. We are all required to develop particular true 
beliefs based upon very individual considerations; if doxastic blame serves to regulate this 
practice any reliable account will track with this variation. I would also argue that such examples 
of varying doxastic blame are not restricted to the professional realm. We can be blamed for 
many beliefs simply as believers, and we assign different levels of blame to these beliefs 
depending on their potential for causing harm. 
One might also object by arguing that this sort of blame completely flouts McHugh’s 
conclusion (which I endorsed above) that truth norms cannot ground practices of doxastic blame. 
However, doxastic blame of the sort above is not justified exclusively in light of a truth norm. 
Norms governing professional conduct and our roles as epistemic agents in a larger community 
are the primary basis for doxastic blame directed at such failings. It is not in virtue of the fact 
that myself or the neurosurgeon develop this false belief that we are blameworthy. It is in virtue 
of the fact that it could be reasonably demanded of either of us to take steps to prevent the 
acquisition or maintenance of such a belief. Such demands are themselves made reasonable by 
the harm this belief could cause in our epistemic community. However, the potential for harm in 
the case of the neurosurgeon is orders of magnitude higher than that of myself or any layperson. 
The doxastic blame appropriately attributable to her for this epistemic failing is much higher as a 
result. 
 I should note that in the above example my relative inability to harm others with my false 
belief in the location of the medulla oblongata does not eliminate my blameworthiness, it only 
minimizes it. However, I would argue that for some beliefs, doxastic blame can be entirely 
eliminated by the relative inability to produce epistemic harms. I imagine Chase Wren’s 
examples of useless beliefs, such as the belief that the number of blades of grass on the 
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Whitehouse lawn is even.43 Even if we knew for a fact that that belief was false, it seems 
ludicrous to imagine myself being blamed for it in some nightmarish scenario where the death of 
several orphans results from my false belief.  
One might argue to the contrary that some minimal blame does persist in such instances. I 
would respond that it is important to keep in mind that we are extremely limited as epistemic 
agents; we have limited time and resources to devote to the management of our beliefs. Perhaps 
if omniscience were humanly obtainable, I would be obligated to acquire a true belief about the 
number of blades of grass on the Whitehouse lawn to prevent any potential nightmare orphan 
scenarios. But as it stands, figuring out the truth of that useless (and soon to change) fact is not a 
good use of my epistemic resources. If I am only concerned with limiting the harms I impose on 
my epistemic community, that end would be better served by improving my beliefs regarding the 
most impactful facts first, so as to most effectively use my limited epistemic resources. If such a 
prescription has force, I should be blamed if I waste my time pursuing a true belief regarding the 
Whitehouse lawn.44 In doing so I unwisely spend my epistemic resources and end up with more 
poorly managed beliefs than I otherwise might have, which puts my epistemic community at 
increased risk of harms.  
The second factor I see as influencing the appropriate amount of blame that can be 
assigned to a belief is the degree of control that one has over a belief. In the previous chapter I 
expressly denied that control is necessary for doxastic responsibility. However, the case is not 
the same for doxastic blame, as the above discussion should make clear. Recall that I have 
 
43 Chase Wren, “Truth Is Not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98,  
(2017), 111. 
44 I do not really think such prescriptions can have normative force, I merely include this example to demonstrate 
that when doxastic blame is grounded in epistemic harms the limitations we have as epistemic agents make blame 
inappropriate in some instances where we cannot be obligated to spend our epistemic resources.  
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characterized doxastic blame along the lines of Smith’s “moral protest account”: in blaming, one 
judges that someone is blameworthy, and engages in some form of protest against their 
blameworthy act. On this account, I believe that blame directed at an act outside of an object’s 
control is incoherent. 
Lindsay Rettler articulates what generates this requirement for control well. Rettler 
conceives of blame as a demand that someone acknowledge they have failed to adhere to a norm; 
she notes that by being a demand of this sort blame extends beyond the merely evaluative 
judgement that one has failed in the fulfillment of that norm.45 Given my endorsement of Smith’s 
“moral protest” account, Rettler and I disagree on the specific attitudes required for blame. Still, 
I do not think that Rettler’s “demand for acknowledgement” and Smith’s “moral protest” differ 
on this point of control.46 Whether blaming consists in protesting the actions of the blamed or 
demanding an acknowledgement of their failure to adhere to a norm, blaming when one’s target 
had not control over their action is incoherent. In either case, there must be something the 
believer could have done in principle to avoid acting in a blameworthy way. Doxastic blame 
cannot therefore extend to beliefs over which we exercise no control.  
To place these concepts in a doxastic context, consider Angela Smith’s example of Bert 
and Abigail, who both have equally reprehensible racist beliefs. While Abigail was born into a 
community that imposed such beliefs upon her, Bert developed his racist beliefs coming from a 
family that encouraged more tolerant and egalitarian attitudes.47 Smith uses this example to 
emphasize the point that both Bert and Abigail are equally responsible for their racist attitudes. 
 
45 Lindsay Rettler, “Answerability without Blame?” Synthese 195, (2018), 2211 
46 I should note as well that the sort of control that Rettler and I have in mind here is identical with the indirect 
influence that Rik Peels argues we have over beliefs. c.f. Rettler, 2215. 
47 Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115, no. 2 (2005): 267.  
Conk 31 
Given the arguments I presented in the previous chapter, I hope I have made it clear that I agree 
with Smith on this point.  
Interestingly though, Smith notes that these cases demand different degrees of criticism.48 
This seems to align well with intuition, as we often take into account the epistemic habits of a 
believer before we blame them for any flawed belief. The case of Bert and Abigail thus supports 
the relationship between doxastic blame and control I have offered above. Abigail is still 
blameworthy for her beliefs, as it was not in principle impossible for her to seek out and acquire 
more tolerant views. However, Bert is much more blameworthy for the same beliefs, as he had to 
actively fight against the current of his sympathetic upbringing to end up with the pernicious 
beliefs he has. In just the same way, we wouldn’t regard someone who read half a Wikipedia 
page on cholera as equally blameworthy as someone who checked with experts and consulted 
multiple sources, even if they both ended up with the same false belief that cholera is caused by a 
virus; no less would we be lenient with someone who swung a golf club in a lightning storm. 
Thus, I hope to have demonstrated in this chapter that while factors such as potential 
harms or control have no effect on whether an agent is responsible for a belief, they do impact 
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3. Responsible Belief 
 Having characterized doxastic blame and the conditions which mitigate it, I will now 
argue for an account of responsible belief as blameless belief. In doing so I will build on 
arguments advanced by Rik Peels. While I agree with Peels that responsible belief is blameless 
belief, I will note several key areas of emphasis on which our accounts diverge. Accordingly, I 
will begin this chapter with a defense of responsible belief as blameless belief rather than 
praiseworthy belief. Once I have defended this view, I will then apply my analysis of doxastic 
blame to demonstrate the differences my concept of blameless belief has with that of Peels. I will 
then conclude by summarizing and restating what criteria I argue are necessary for blameless 
belief. 
Responsible Belief as Blameless Belief 
 Before I consider arguments for characterizations of responsible belief, I will first make 
one terminological clarification. In the first chapter of this work, I considered the conditions 
required for doxastic responsibility. Questions of doxastic responsibility consider when it is 
appropriate to normatively evaluate someone for their beliefs. Doxastic responsibility should not 
be confused with the concepts of responsible belief or responsible believers which I will consider 
in this chapter. When I call a belief or believer responsible, I do not mean to refer to the 
appropriateness of normative evaluations of either (except perhaps indirectly). Instead, I refer to 
the evaluation we give to either when we approve of them in a specific way. I call a believer 
responsible in the same way we would call a ship captain responsible if she manages to safely 
navigate her ship, and we would call an accountant responsible if she thoroughly avoided clerical 
errors. 
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 In order to characterize responsible belief, I will use the same normative terms that I have 
referenced throughout this work, namely praise, blame, and neutral appraisal. If one takes this 
approach, it seems there are only two possible analyses of responsible belief: one could require 
that responsible belief be either praiseworthy or blameless. These competing theses seem both 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.49 I prefer the latter account of responsible belief 
as blameless belief and will support this preference using arguments provided by Peels. 
 My defense will benefit greatly by beginning with a more rigorous characterization of 
these two theses. We can regard one as holding a belief praiseworthily if they are appropriately 
liable to positive evaluation for holding that belief. Likewise, one holds a belief blamelessly if 
one is immune to negative evaluation for holding that belief. It follows from these definitions 
that all praiseworthy belief must also be blameless, as one cannot simultaneously be evaluated 
positively and negatively for holding the same belief.50 Thus, we can see that these two camps 
both agree that all praiseworthy belief is responsible; their contention concerns only those 
neutrally appraised beliefs which deserve neither praise nor blame.  
 To defend the claim that responsible belief is blameless rather than praiseworthy, Peels 
offers several considerations meant to demonstrate the explanatory superiority of the former. 
Peels first suggests that our evaluation of agents should be analogous in both moral and 
epistemic contexts.51 In order to call someone responsible in the moral realm, we do not require 
that they perform any praiseworthy actions; it seems instead that to be morally responsible, one 
needs only avoid violating any ethical norms.52 To give an example, we can call a forester 
 
49 The remaining alternative is to regard blameworthy belief as responsible, but this seems incoherent. c.f. Anthony 
Booth and Rik Peels, “Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief,” The Journal of Philosophy 107, no. 5 (2010): 
258.  
50 One cannot appropriately be simultaneously evaluated in these ways, at least. c.f. Booth and Peels, 257. 
51 Rik Peels, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 44.  
52 Ibid.  
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responsible if he manages his woodlands such that they remain in the same condition throughout 
his stewardship.53 Performing praiseworthy actions such as expanding and improving the woods 
are not required for his responsibility, while blameworthy actions such as overharvesting 
suspend it. 
 Peels uses epistemic examples as well to show that praiseworthiness is too high a 
standard for responsible belief. One such example is skepticism about the external world: most 
everyone believes in some external world, but it does not seem right to call anyone praiseworthy 
for doing so. Belief in the external world would therefore be considered irresponsible if 
responsible belief must be praiseworthy.54 I will further emphasize that such examples can be 
extended to much more mundane matters than skepticism. It seems that praiseworthy belief is 
somewhat rare, and even more so is an agent who can achieve it consistently. It would not be 
right to call the vast number of beliefs which we hold inescapably praiseworthy; should we 
require such praiseworthiness for responsibility, it would seem that we all hold a great deal of 
beliefs irresponsibly. Take for example the belief that I in fact have a brain which deals with all 
of my sensory input and information processing. It seems bizarre to consider me praiseworthy 
for holding this belief (and countless others like it), and equally absurd to call me irresponsible 
for holding it.  
 Thus, I consider the analysis of responsible belief as blameless belief decidedly 
preferable to those requiring praiseworthiness. While Peels goes on to refute arguments against 
responsible belief as blameless belief, thorough advocacy for responsible belief as blameless 
belief is neither the primary goal of this work nor necessary to my project. Accordingly, I will 
 
53 Except in cases where he has an obligation to improve them. 
54 Peels, 45. 
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further develop my account of responsible belief with the (hopefully well supported) assumption 
that blamelessness is sufficient for it. 
Our Doxastic Obligations 
 Having concluded that responsible belief is blameless belief, I will now continue to lay 
out my characterization of blameless belief itself. In the previous chapter I identified doxastic 
blame with the violation of doxastic norms without excuse. Accordingly, in the remainder of this 
chapter I will consider which doxastic norms we are obligated to adhere to, and what conditions 
excuse us for their violation. I will begin with a summary of Rik Peels’ account of our doxastic 
obligations and contrast it with my own. In doing so, I hope to refine Peels’ account through 
emphasis on the interpersonal doxastic obligations I have heavily emphasized throughout this 
work. 
Peels develops his account of responsible belief in terms of “intellectual obligations.”55 
While I have described Peel’s analysis of such obligations elsewhere, I will begin by more 
thoroughly describing them here. Peels argues that we have an intellectual obligation to perform 
some action or series of actions when the failure to do so will lead us to acquire beliefs that are in 
some way bad.56 It is important to note that these intellectual obligations are all-things-
considered obligations.57 That is, one cannot be blamed for violating an intellectual obligation 
when doing so was necessary to prevent acquiring an even worse belief; we are only doxastically 
obligated to do what we should all things considered.58 
Peels further develops this initial definition of intellectual obligations with a few key 
distinctions. The first of these is the distinction between objective badness and subjective 
 
55 Peels, 9. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Peels, 119. 
58 Anthony Robert Booth, “All Things Considered Duties to Believe,” Synthese 187, (2012): 512.  
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badness. On Peels’ account, we have objective intellectual obligations to perform those actions 
that would in actuality prevent us from acquiring bad beliefs, and subjective intellectual 
obligations to perform those actions which we mistakenly think would prevent us from acquiring 
bad beliefs.59 So even if my acquiring the false belief that my desk is made of marble is not 
objectively bad by any measure, if I think it is in some way bad I still have a subjective 
obligation to correct it. Peels also distinguishes contingent and non-contingent intellectual 
obligations. We have intellectual obligations contingently which derive from the specific roles 
and professions we occupy, while non-contingent intellectual obligations apply to all doxastic 
agents.60  
While Peels lingers on these points and develops them with a great deal of rigor, the 
condensed summary I have made so far should be sufficient for the purposes of this work. 
Already, it should be fairly easy to note a divergence in grounding between my account and 
Peels’. Recall that in the prior chapter I emphasized the fact that the epistemic harms which 
result from our beliefs are the ultimate grounding for doxastic blame. For this reason, I do not 
take epistemic fault itself to be the primary justification for doxastic blame: while one’s belief 
may be epistemically or practically bad, the pro tanto obligations generated by these 
considerations are always defeated by any competing moral obligation to minimize the harms 
one causes. 
To argue for and clarify this claim I will point once more to Chase Wren’s examples of 
pointless truths (originally coined by Johnathan Kvanvig).61 Such examples provide a useful 
heuristic, because they allow us to observe our intuitions about epistemic problems isolated from 
 
59 Peels, 97. 
60 Peels, 101. 
61 Chase Wren, “Truth is Not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98, (2017): 111. 
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any moral or practical considerations. This is important because often we value knowing the 
truth of the propositions for primarily instrumental reasons- for most engineers knowing 
Newtonian mechanics is useful only insofar as it aids in bridge construction, for example.62 
Examining the value of true propositions divorced from such instrumental gains thus allows us to 
more clearly see their worth compared to similar moral stakes. 
Take as an example the proposition that the number of grains of sand on the western 
coast of South Africa is a multiple of three. I would not be any morally better or worse off 
simply for knowing the truth value of this proposition, but I would be minimally better off 
epistemically. If we ask ourselves how much moral cost we are willing to incur in order to secure 
such epistemic gains, I think such examples make clear that the answer is none. In such cases, 
even the smallest moral cost (e.g. a pinprick given to a total stranger) seems unjustified when the 
only gain is knowing the truth of a proposition for its own sake: we simply do not care enough 
about such propositions to harm someone. I regard the case as the same for any other purely 
epistemic obligation, no matter how epistemically significant. 
Accordingly, while I will not argue that we have no epistemic obligations whatsoever, for 
our all-things-considered obligation to align with our epistemic obligation the all-things-
considered obligation must either be completely non-moral or align with some moral 
obligation.63 Put differently, any epistemic obligation at odds with a moral obligation will be 
defeated by it. It is also important to note that such purely epistemic scenarios are quite rare in 
any real circumstances; as I pointed out in the last chapter, how we use our epistemic resources 
 
62 Miriam Schleifer McCormick, Believing Against the Evidence (New York: Routledge, 2015): 8. 
63 Wren offers a related argument that there are no epistemic obligations. Instead, all epistemic obligations are 
parasitic upon some moral consideration. While I argue that there are still purely epistemic obligations (and thus 
disagree with Wren’s conclusion), his arguments express the same advocacy for the primacy of moral obligations 
that I argue for here, nor does his conclusion undermine the ultimate point I make in this chapter. c.f. Chase Wren, 
“Why There are no Epistemic Duties,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 46, no. 1 (2007): 115-136. 
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and which true and false beliefs we have can make a huge difference to our moral standing. It 
would thus be quite difficult to divorce these seemingly distinct realms and arrive at a purely 
epistemic obligation. So, when considering the badness of our beliefs and its impact on our 
obligations, I place our moral obligations at the forefront. 
To give a more concrete example to illustrate these concepts, assume I simultaneously 
believe all of the propositions in the following inconsistent triad. 
(1) If ducks are not around in late winter, they must migrate elsewhere. 
(2) Ducks are not around in late winter.  
(3) Ducks are not capable of long distance migration. 
If we stipulate that I have an epistemic obligation to believe rationally, then continuing to  
believe all of these propositions would violate such an obligation and I would be required to 
revise my beliefs. While this epistemic obligation persists, I argue that I also have a moral 
obligation to my epistemic community to revise my beliefs. Again, this is grounded in the 
potential harm I might cause by continuing to hold such beliefs (e.g. by misleading children or 
wasting someone’s time when they explain to me why I am wrong). I argue that this moral 
obligation provides a much stronger reason I ought to revise my beliefs than my purely epistemic 
duty to believe rationally. 
This characterization of the interplay between our moral and epistemic obligations has 
important implications for my analysis of responsible belief. It also marks a significant departure 
my account will have from Peels’ view. According to Peels, we have two main types of 
obligations grounded in epistemic badness: the first arises when we believe that the failure to 
perform some action will lead to the future acquisition of epistemically bad beliefs (such badness 
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is subjective).64 The latter type arises in cases of doxastic discrepancy, in which we recognize 
something epistemically bad about our beliefs. Doxastic discrepancy generates an objective 
obligation to eliminate the discrepancy, and a subjective obligation to perform an action which 
one thinks will eliminate the discrepancy.65  
Given what I have argued above about the import of moral obligations, I find this 
characterization to be so limited that it becomes irrelevant. This irrelevance stems from the fact 
that such moral obligations are ubiquitous in our everyday doxastic practice. Recall that I believe 
moral obligations always defeat any countervailing epistemic obligation. Since in almost all the 
instances where we have an epistemic obligation there is a concurrent moral obligation, our all-
things-considered obligation is always aligned with what is morally demanded of us. I take these 
moral obligations to be objective (that is, they remains in some capacity whether or not the 
believer recognizes them as an obligation).66 Since the extreme majority of our intellectual 
obligations are thus objective, I take Peels’ distinction between objective and subjective 
obligations to be practically irrelevant. 
 Even if all of this seems correct, it may not yet be clear why it runs contrary to Peels’ 
account. I argue that if the scope of our purely epistemic obligations is as restricted as I suspect, 
then the extent of our would-be intellectual obligations is much greater than Peels suggests in his 
account. Consequently, I argue that nearly all of our doxastic activities have a corresponding 
objective moral obligation owing to the potential harms bad beliefs could produce. While this 
may not run directly contrary to Peels’ account (in fact, I think one could fit it in his framework 
without modification), it certainly aggravates a fear Peels had.  
 
64 Peels, 106. 
65 Peels, 107. 
66 It seems Peels does as well, c.f. “When it comes to non-epistemic obligations, we have an obligation to avoid 
objective badness,” Peels, 105. 
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Recall that Peels limits the scope of our objective epistemic obligations to cases of 
doxastic discrepancy. He motivates this constraint at least in part with the fact that our having an  
obligation in all cases of epistemically bad belief would result in practically infinite number of 
intellectual obligations which we routinely violate.67 Without such restrictions on this class of 
objective epistemic obligations, every epistemically flawed belief we hold would represent a 
violation of our intellectual obligations. Considering all the beliefs we have which rest on faulty 
logic, a lack of evidence, and poor quality evidence, we would all routinely violate a staggering 
number of our intellectual obligations every day if these objective obligations were binding. 
Peels thinks that this is an unacceptable outcome for any realistic account of responsible belief. If 
my emphasis on the potential harms of beliefs commits me to an equally large number of 
doxastic obligations, how can I square my account with the multitude of obligations such harms 
would create? 
I offer two considerations to mitigate such worries. I first reiterate that I do believe there 
are excusing conditions which limit the extent of doxastic blame. I will lay these out later in this 
chapter. The second is articulated well by Scott Stapleford in dealing with a similar issue which 
he calls “the justificational fecundity of evidence.” Stapleford recognizes that all the sensory data 
we receive and propositions we already believe justify a practically infinite number of further 
beliefs equally well.68 So, if we have any duties to manage our beliefs at all (Stapleford argues 
that we do) it will be impossible to fulfill these duties perfectly.69 Accordingly, Stapleford 
compares our epistemic duties to Kantian imperfect moral duties. Imperfect duties are 
distinguished as general guiding principles which seek to satisfy some general end rather than 
 
67 Peels, 104. 
68 Scott Stapleford, “Epistemic Duties and Failure to Understand One’s Evidence,” Principia 16, no. 1 (2012): 167. 
69 Stapleford, 168. 
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inviolable maxims we are required to uphold. 70 When and how these duties are fulfilled requires 
our judgement, and there is no upper limit to their fulfillment. 
A characterization of our doxastic (or in Peels’ terminology, intellectual) obligations as 
imperfect duties is indispensable to our understanding of them, especially in the interpersonal 
context I have emphasized here. Nor is it unmotivated: no matter which metric one chooses as 
the base of our doxastic duties, there is no means available to us by which we can be perfect 
believers. It is impossible for us to establish a fully internally consistent doxastic framework, 
perfectly proportion our beliefs to our evidence, cultivate infallible intellectual virtues, etc. It is 
also impossible to spend all of our time examining the sum total of our beliefs to correct any 
errors we might have internally, or to seek out enough evidence to root out all of our false 
beliefs. When and how we seek to revise our beliefs requires us to develop sharp judgement in 
determining the best use of our epistemic resources. Thus any account based on perfect doxastic 
duties will be left wanting or will have to provide quite broad excusing conditions. Apart from 
these differences in grounding and the characterization of our doxastic obligations as imperfect 
duties, I can accept Peels’ account of doxastic obligations without much modification.  
Excused Blameworthy Belief 
Regarding excuses, Peels suggests two major categories which can mitigate or eliminate 
the blame appropriate to one’s violation of an intellectual obligation. The first of these is force; if 
one is compelled to violate an intellectual obligation, then they are excused from blame for doing 
so.71 The second category of excuse Peels offers is ignorance. Peels suggests that ignorance can 
provide a partial or full excuse for the violation of one’s intellectual obligations in several 
 
70 Ibid. 
71 Peels, 138. 
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instances. One can be ignorant of their intellectual obligation, their ability to fulfill it, or the fact 
that one of their actions will lead to the violation of intellectual obligations in the future.72  
I agree that blameworthy beliefs acquired as the result of compulsion should be excused. 
I find Peels’ account of ignorance as an excuse for the violation of intellectual obligations 
acceptable as well, but again feel it would benefit from increased emphasis on blameworthy 
ignorance. While Peels does acknowledge that ignorance itself can be blameworthy, I worry that 
he fails to properly emphasize and develop this point.73 Accordingly, I will elaborate on which 
cases of ignorance are blameworthy below. 
To organize this discussion, I begin with a reminder of Peels’ distinction between 
contingent and non-contingent obligations. Recall that these point respectively to the obligations 
we have as the result of the roles or professions that we occupy and the obligations attributable to 
all believers. Sandford Goldberg provides an excellent account of when ignorance can be 
blameworthy and thus fails to excuse for each of these types of obligations.74 Goldberg argues 
that when it can be legitimately expected of one based upon some role they fill that they are 
aware of x, their ignorance of x is itself blameworthy.75 While “some role they fill” may at first 
glance seem to point exclusively to professional or institutional roles, it is important to note that 
Goldberg extends his argument to those expectations which are appropriate to all as mature 
epistemic and moral agents.76  
An example of such expectations is the assumption that one (if they belong to a 
community of mostly literate agents) read carefully. To illustrate why this extends beyond the 
 
72 Peels, 179. 
73 Peels, 185. 
74 Sanford C. Goldberg, “Should Have Known,” Synthese 194, (2017): 2863-2894. 
75 Goldberg, 2868. 
76 Goldberg, 2877 
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occupational or institutional roles we fill, imagine that a legal associate skips over several lines 
when editing an appellate brief. While they have certainly failed in their professional duty, they 
need not be an attorney to have this expectation legitimately thrust upon them; Goldberg argues 
that this and other similar expectations generate obligations upon us simply as mature epistemic 
agents, and not in virtue of any other roles we occupy.77  
Thus ignorance can fail to excuse both our contingent and non-contingent obligations.78 I 
will not go into detail as to what expectations can be legitimately imposed upon us either as 
believers or as a result of the specific roles we occupy. Such expectations are far too individual 
and context dependent to be articulated with any degree of rigor. However, I will emphasize that 
such blameworthy ignorance covers many of the cases we encounter in daily life; it is quite a 
rare circumstance that one should be ignorant while not violating any of their contingent or non-
contingent obligations. 
Responsible Belief as Harm Reduction 
 I will now summarize this chapter with a collected restatement of my account of 
responsible belief. I have argued above that responsible belief is blameless belief. I have also 
noted that practically all of our doxastic obligations are imposed upon us in virtue of their moral 
force; we are thus blameworthy as believers when our beliefs put someone in our epistemic 
community in harm’s way. Given the practically infinite number of beliefs we have which may 
create such harms, our obligations to minimize them are best characterized as imperfect duties: 
there is no upper limit to how well we can satisfy these obligations, and when and how we do is 
 
77 The caveat that these epistemic agents must be mature is added to exclude those like children who cannot be 
expected to embody such epistemic virtues yet. 
78 Ibid. 
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a matter of judgement. There are also two major circumstances which mitigate the blame we are 
subject to for beliefs which generate harms. 
Recall that in the last chapter, I distinguished between the mere judgement that one is 
blameworthy and blaming proper. Importantly, I concluded that blaming proper is only 
appropriate when the target of one’s blame could have avoided acting blameworthily. This 
condition is generative of the two categories of excuse which I have noted above, excuses which 
make blame inappropriate.79 One is not susceptible to blame if they developed their belief out of 
compulsion or ignorance, where their ignorance is not itself blameworthy. Ignorance is 
blameworthy when it could be reasonably expected of that believer to have performed actions to 
address their ignorance, whether or not they knew that such courses of action were available to 
them or that they had a duty to correct their ignorance. 
Therefore, one holds a belief responsibly when they fail to generate harms in their 
epistemic community by holding that belief or are excused for doing so. Now that I have 
specified what makes individual beliefs responsible, in the next chapter I will continue to derive 
from this principle the long term characteristics which make believers responsible as doxastic 
agents: what course of action is advisable to us as believers in order to globally minimize the 







79 To be precise, evaluative blame is still possible in such cases. 
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4. Doxastic Virtue 
In the previous chapter, I provided an account of responsible belief as blameless belief 
and continued to characterize the doxastic obligations to which we are bound. In doing so, I 
found Rik Peels’ accounts of each quite tenable, though argued that some points (mainly 
regarding the extent of our doxastic obligations and excusing conditions for them) were in need 
of emphasis and reframing. Throughout this work, I have emphasized that one of the most 
valuable insights an account of responsible belief can provide is guidance for believers. Given 
this importance, I now want to apply my characterization of faulty beliefs to this end. That is, I 
want to consider how we can best navigate our doxastic lives to reduce the number of faulty 
beliefs for which we are blameworthy. 
In this chapter I will use the conclusions I have arrived at concerning doxastic obligations 
and blame to argue for a particular characterization of responsible believers. I argue that if 
responsible belief is blameless belief, responsible believers are those who act in a way such that 
their blameworthy beliefs are minimized. To this end, my primary aim is to provide an account 
of the qualities which minimize the blame one might be subject to as a believer. In doing so, I 
will draw primarily from prior accounts offered by Rik Peels and James Montmarquet. Peels’ 
work on excusing conditions for doxastic blame provides a motivation for my account, and 
Montmarquet’s work on epistemic virtue provides its content.  
Based upon the conclusions Peels reaches in this argument, I will argue that the proper 
approach to believing well is the cultivation of doxastic virtue. I will ultimately conclude that 
Montmarquet’s virtue of epistemic conscientiousness is the most critical quality for responsible 
belief. I will also expand upon his concept of epistemic conscientiousness to better account for 
the interpersonal dimension of belief I have emphasized throughout this work. Finally, I will 
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contrast this approach with alternative accounts which prefer the revision of one’s current beliefs 
through reflection or different epistemic virtues and defend my preference for Montmarquet’s 
approach. 
Blameless Ignorance and the Regress Problem 
 In this section I will lay out an objection Peels notes to his account of blameless 
ignorance and his response to this objection. The objection is centered on Peels’ claim that 
ignorance is only blameworthy in cases where one could have prevented their ignorance by 
meeting their intellectual obligation to do so.80 Peels notes that others such as Montmarquet, 
Michael Zimmerman, and William Fitzpatrick have voiced concerns that such a claim leads to an 
infinite regress of blamelessness.  
The issue arises when one considers that to be blameworthy for ignorance on Peels’ 
account, their blame must result from a past action which caused the ignorance.81 However, the 
same could be equally well said of those past actions themselves: the action(s) which caused 
one’s ignorance were performed in ignorance, so there must be some even more distant past 
action in virtue of which this past ignorance is blameworthy.82 Such explanations lead quickly to 
an infinite regress, with no terminal blameworthy action to break the cycle. Take as an example 
my ignorance that I was meant to provide feedback on a friend’s paper draft. If I am 
blameworthy for this ignorance, I could point to a past action where I failed to exercise due 
cognizance of my obligation which would have prevented my ignorance (e.g. setting a reminder 
or writing myself a note). However, to avoid blame for my failure to write myself a note or set a 
 
80 Rik Peels, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 
188. 
81 Peels, 189. 
82 Ibid. 
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reminder, I could just as easily point to my ignorance that such cognizance was required of me. 
From there, the regress continues indefinitely. 
The only means of breaking such a cycle are cases of akrasia, where one clearly 
recognizes their intellectual obligation and decides to violate it anyway.83 However, Peels notes 
that objectors maintain that akrasia is quite rare relative to how prevalent blameworthy 
ignorance is. Differently put, there are not enough cases of akrasia to account for all the 
blameworthy ignorance we perceive. Thus we are left on the horns of a dilemma, wanting neither 
to limit the cases of blameworthy ignorance to such rare cases of akrasia or to tolerate the 
infinite chains of blamelessness noted above.84 
Peels responds to this argument by claiming that cases of akrasia in the doxastic realm 
are neither as limited nor as impotent as the objectors suppose. He begins his response by 
demonstrating that cases of akrasia compound in a way that makes them a viable solution to 
these chains of ignorance. If we suppose that akrasia is responsible for only five out of every 
hundred blameworthy acts, we need only go back 15 actions before it is more likely than not that 
one is blameworthy for their act due to akrasia than ignorance.85 This fifteen act chain may 
provide quite a distant grounding for one’s blame, but it is not infinitely far away as the objectors 
suggest. 
Peels also suggests that akrasia is much more prevalent in the doxastic realm than 
intuition initially suggests. His suggestion is grounded in the claim that epistemic akrasia is 
importantly different from the moral akrasia on which we base our intuitions. He motivates this 
claim by pointing out that while in most instances we have a clear indication of the consequences 
 
83 Ibid. 
84 Peels, 190. 
85 Peels, 192. 
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of our moral failings, the consequences of those in the epistemic realm are more obscure: we are 
much less likely to foresee the particular beliefs we will acquire when we violate an epistemic 
obligation, as well as the greater moral and practical consequences that will result.86  
To give an example, imagine a man called Alonso ignores evidence in an attempt to 
maintain a belief that is dear to him, knowing that his behavior is epistemically unsound. In such 
cases it seems extremely difficult to predict the consequences of such epistemically bad 
behavior. His unsupported belief may lead him to mislead others, to fail to fulfill certain 
obligations he has, or nothing may come of it at all. Contrast this with the case of Alfonso (who 
happens to be a high ranking bureaucrat) taking a bribe from an oil executive wanting to evade 
environmental regulations. The consequences of Alfonso’s akratic bribe taking are much more 
clear: likely some environmental damage will result, respect for the regulations will diminish, 
and future corruption may be provoked by the success of the oil tycoon’s attempt. While in the 
case of the bribe the consequences are not easy to ignore, the ambiguous consequences of 
Alonso’s epistemic failings makes them much easier for him to commit even when he knows that 
they are epistemically flawed. 
Finally, Peels also describes dormant and tacit beliefs as a possible source of  
blameworthy belief. Roughly, one holds a belief that p dormantly whenever one does not at the 
moment actively consider that p, but has in the past believed the p and not changed their mind 
since.87 One holds a belief that p tacitly whenever one has never considered that p, but would 
when prompted believe that p. Peels argues that one can be blameworthy for not acting on a 
dormant or tacit belief. 
 
86 Peels, 193 
87 Peels, 36. 
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 Imagine for example that I dormantly believe my garbage disposal is full of silverware.88 
If I fail to inform my roommate that the garbage disposal is full of silverware while I watch them 
reach to turn it on, I am blameworthy even though I am neither ignorant nor acting from 
akrasia.89 It is much more accurate to describe this as a case of epistemic carelessness, or 
blameworthy failure to act upon a dormant or tacit belief. 
 I have laid out Peels’ response to this argument not primarily because I was troubled by 
the objection itself, but because his response provides a clear summary for what he takes to be 
the most common (if not an exhaustive list of) instances of blameworthy belief. It is particularly 
helpful because it synthesizes his accounts of intellectual obligations and excusing conditions 
into a single focus. One is blameworthy without excuse for a belief when one acts from this sort 
of epistemic akrasia or carelessly fails to act on a dormant or tacit belief.  
 While not critical for the purposes of this work, it may be of interest to consider whether 
or not on Peels’ account doxastic blameworthiness is conceptually limited to these two cases. 
Given how thoroughly Peels develops these points, I suspect the relationship is indeed one of 
necessity, especially in the epistemic realm. Recall that Peels essentially limits our epistemic 
intellectual obligations to those that are subjective, i.e. those we recognize as epistemically bad.90 
This would seem to make akrasia or carelessness a necessary condition for epistemic 
blameworthiness, as on Peels’ account we must recognize our epistemic shortcomings to have an 
 
88 Perhaps I realized that the garbage disposal was full of silverware earlier but forgot about it. A good example of a 
tacit rather than dormant belief in this example would be the belief that my roommate would be upset by the garbage 
disposal being turned on while full of silverware. I probably have not considered this belief in the past, but would 
naturally believe it if prompted to based on other beliefs I already had about my roommate’s valuing the silverware 
and garbage disposal. 
89 Peels, 194. 
90 Our only objective intellectual obligations are to eliminate any doxastic discrepancy which results from our 
recognition of such epistemic badness. c.f. Peels, 97. 
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intellectual obligation to correct them. We must then violate them knowingly, which is only 
possible if we act out of akrasia. 
 In the moral realm, things are less clear cut. Unlike the epistemic cases noted above, 
Peels acknowledges that we can have intellectual obligations in virtue of objective moral 
badness. Could we violate these by means other than akrasia or carelessness? I think that for 
Peels the answer remains “no”. Even if intellectual obligations exist in such cases, violations of 
them will either result from the believer knowingly violating them (which would amount to 
akrasia) or violating them out of ignorance. Cases where one violates a moral intellectual 
obligation out of ignorance will generally be fully excused.91 The remaining cases where one is 
blameworthily ignorant are traced back to cases of akrasia or carelessness, as in the argument 
above.  
Responsible Believers and Epistemic Virtue 
 Regardless of whether or not the above argument establishes the necessary limitation of 
doxastic blame to cases of akrasia or carelessness, it at least motivates the claim that these two 
categories account for the vast majority of unexcused doxastic blame: this is the premise on 
which the remainder of this chapter will turn. I argue that if all or most of our doxastic failings 
stem from these sorts of doxastic akrasia or carelessness, responsible believers are best 
characterized as those who have attained the epistemic virtue which minimizes these failings.  
 To motivate this claim, we must first investigate what such cases of such doxastic failings 
look like. I take acts like wishful thinking as a paradigmatic example of doxastic akrasia; when 
we think wishfully (and are aware of doing so), we recognize that we are not epistemically 
justified in believing that p but do so regardless. If I choose to believe that I am morally flawless 
 
91 Peels, 179.  
Conk 53 
despite having clear evidence to the contrary simply because it improves my self-image, I am 
acting out of doxastic akrasia. Other acts in this category might include biased evidence 
gathering practices and closed mindedness.  
 With this picture of doxastic failure in mind, it should be clear that the common thread 
uniting cases of such failure is insufficient attention to what is epistemically demanded of the 
believer. In cases of wishful thinking, flawed evidence gathering, and closed mindedness, the 
believer inappropriately subjugates these epistemic demands to some other purpose- their pride, 
discomfort, etc. In cases of carelessness, one simply fails to sufficiently regard the demands 
imposed upon them (out of laziness, inattention, or disregard). Thus, in all cases a blameworthy 
believer fails to appropriately act upon these demands.  
 This diagnosis provides a strong justification for my claim that epistemic virtue is critical 
for responsible belief. In all of the above cases, doxastic failure results from some lack of 
epistemic fortitude: one fails to accurately appraise and respond to the stakes of their epistemic 
actions and generates some harm as a result.92 Given this conclusion, I point to the cultivation of 
epistemic virtue as the proper means of combatting such failure. Many epistemic virtues have 
been spelled out and advocated for in prior works, including open-mindedness, intellectual 
courage, introspection, or clear-sightedness.93 However, not all of these are relevant to 
characterizing responsible believers, as not all limit cases of doxastic blame. This is why I 
indicate Montmarquet’s virtue of epistemic conscientiousness as solely important to responsible 
belief. 
 
92 Or worse still, one accurately appraises the consequences of their epistemic actions and chooses to promote their 
interests at the expense of others. 
93 Jason Baehr, “Character Reliability and Virtue Epistemology,” The Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 223 (2006): 
193. 
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 In his account, Montmarquet echoes many of the same points I have highlighted above: 
doxastic failure is ultimately rooted in a failure to act with due care epistemically.94 This lack of 
care manifests as insufficient regard for the truth in one’s epistemic actions. By “epistemic 
actions” I mean those actions which have a significant relation to our belief forming processes, 
including introspection, evidence gathering, reflection, etc. The disregard to which Montmarquet 
points is the result of one’s priority of their own interests over truth in such actions.95  
Montmarquet offers the virtue of epistemic conscientiousness as the antidote to such 
failure. Epistemic conscientiousness consists in an “underlying desire to believe what is true and 
to avoid belief in what is false.”96 This initial definition may seem unhelpful, as it should be an 
obvious goal for anybody looking to believe well. Noting this, Montmarquet further explains that 
conscientiousness consists in developing this desire for truth such that it cannot be defeated by 
other influences.97 Care is the lifeblood of this virtue; one can only become epistemically 
conscientious by exerting an effort to do so, and a certain amount of this effort is required of 
us.98 
  While I agree with Montmarquet on all of these points, I want to develop his concept of 
epistemic conscientiousness to better account for interpersonal contexts of belief. I argue that an 
important component of epistemic conscientiousness is a cognizance of the greater outcomes of 
one’s epistemic actions. As I noted in the previous chapter, we are extremely limited in the 
resources (time, effort, etc.) that we are capable of committing to our epistemic dealings. 
Accordingly, while I feel that Montmarquet adequately identifies a lack of care as a failure to be 
 
94 James Montmarquet, “Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 
4 (1992): 337. 
95 Montmarquet, 336. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Montmarquet, 338. 
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epistemically conscientious, here I will note mismanaged care as an additional failure. That is to 
say, I argue that exerting as much effort as could be reasonably demanded of one in their 
epistemic dealings is not sufficient for epistemic conscientiousness. I argue that we are 
additionally required to competently manage the ways in which we direct such efforts. 
 To illustrate this point, recall my discussion of Chase Wren’s useless truths. I noted in 
chapter two that it would be inadvisable for one to pursue the truth of the matter concerning the 
number of blades of grass on the Whitehouse lawn. I think it is clear that such an endeavor is a 
waste of one’s epistemic resources, and I have accordingly argued that one might be 
blameworthy for pursuing such an endeavor. Even if one applied more care than anyone could 
reasonably demand of them in the narrow pursuit of such truths, I do not think we would call 
them epistemically conscientious.  
However, I will further argue here that such blame extends beyond these clear-cut cases. 
To this end, I argue that a necessary component of epistemic conscientiousness is sufficient 
cognizance of one’s epistemic duties and the greater consequences of one’s epistemic actions. 
Much of this will be individualized and derive from the roles one occupies. It would be 
epistemically conscientious for example for a father to develop a thorough understanding of his 
child’s character, personality, and tastes. It would be epistemically careless for him to do so 
about a total stranger with whom he is certain he will never interact. 
 Despite the ubiquity of such role-generated demands, our exercise of epistemic 
conscientiousness is not exhausted by cognizance of them alone. In illustrating this claim, again I 
point to the claim made by Sanford Goldberg when discussing his “should have known” 
phenomena. While many of our epistemic obligations are generated by the roles we occupy, 
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there are still obligations that apply universally to us all as epistemic agents.99 In the same vein, I 
argue that we have a corresponding obligation to judiciously allocate our epistemic resources in 
attending to such obligations. “Judicious” management requires that one recognize the needs of 
their epistemic community and their position in it. Doing so will allow them to know which 
epistemic virtues and specific true beliefs are demanded of them (and perhaps more importantly 
which can be safely disregarded), and accordingly how to meet those demands. 
 I will note once more that our ability to meet these demands is inherently imperfect. As in 
the last chapter, I argue that these obligations are best conceived of as imperfect duties to which 
we owe some unspecified degree of attention. This aligns well with Montmarquet’s account, as 
he notes only that “a certain level of effort may rightly be expected of one.”100 Likewise, I will 
conclude with the modified observation that a certain level of effort applied with a certain level 
of judgement may be rightly expected of one. When one applies a sufficient amount of each, they 
are epistemically conscientious. Thus, care towards the truth directed by a keen sense of what is 
demanded of one epistemically are the marks of responsible believers. 
The Advantage of a Virtue-Theoretic Account 
 I want to indicate explicitly that this virtue-theoretic account is directly motivated by the 
observations made by Peels in the above section: we are blameworthy for beliefs which result 
either from akrasia or carelessness.101 However, given my definition of responsible believers as 
those who minimize the doxastic blame attributable to them one might argue that there are better 
means of achieving this end than developing an epistemically conscientious character. Here I 
 
99 Sanford Goldberg, “Should have known,” Sythese 194, (2017): 2877. 
100 Montmarquet, 336. 
101 Ian Church, “Virtue Epistemology,” Philpapers Topic Summaries, https://philpapers.org/browse/virtue-
epistemology   
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will present two such accounts, and attempt to demonstrate the superiority of my own in 
minimizing doxastic blame. 
The first alternative approach to minimizing such harms is to attack one’s belief set 
directly, eliminating all those epistemically flawed beliefs which could produce harms. One 
account which may serve as an example of this is provided by Scott Stapleford. Stapleford 
argues that we have an epistemic duty to believe rationally, and that this duty can only be 
fulfilled by careful introspection and evaluation of the logical relations that hold between our 
beliefs and evidence.102 The best possible fulfillment of our epistemic duties for Stapleford is the 
cultivation of a maximally consistent belief set (that is, internally consistent and consistent with 
the evidence available to us). If one managed to achieve this to a high degree it would seem that 
they would have no blameworthy beliefs, and thus believed responsibly.103 
To meet this objection, I return to an argument I have made above. In minimizing the 
harms we inflict upon our epistemic community through our beliefs, it is not sufficient to merely 
have beliefs that are in perfect accord with our evidence and with each other. We are sometimes 
also obligated to have certain beliefs as a result of the roles we fill; failing to acquire these 
beliefs can often result in serious harms for which one will be blameworthy regardless of 
whether or not they have done anything bad epistemically. While such criteria may provide 
better protocols for agents to develop practically or epistemically, I consider neither of these the 
appropriate ends for responsible believers.104  
 
 
102 Scott Stapleford, “Epistemic Duties and Failure to Understand One’s Evidence,” Principia 16, no. 1 (2012): 169. 
103 Note that Stapleford himself does not make this claim, and the article in which he develops this account speaks of 
duties in epistemic terms only. Here I mean to use his account as an example of an alternative account of doxastic 
obligations, and why striving for epistemic flawlessness misses the mark. 
104 That is, better enable them to achieve their own goals or grow into more successful epistemic agents. 
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Alternatively, one could devise a reliabilist approach to responsible belief rather than the 
responsibilist one I have provided. Whereas responsibilists emphasize the importance of 
intellectual traits of character (such as intellectual courage), reliabilists emphasize the traits of a 
person which are reliably truth conducive (such as good memory or sense perception).105 Given 
this, a reliabilist could argue that in conscientiousness I have selected a virtue that is largely 
irrelevant to responsible belief. Instead, they might argue that developing reliable traits of 
intellectual character would more effectively produce fewer harmful beliefs (and thus a more 
responsible believer) than becoming epistemically conscientious. 
To meet this objection, I point to the conclusion reached above: all cases of unexcused 
doxastic blame are either due to epistemic akrasia or carelessness, whereas all other cases of 
harmful belief are excused. While how well one’s prowess of reasoning or evidence gathering 
may minimize how many harmful beliefs they have, harmful beliefs do not exhaust the 
considerations that factor into blameworthy belief. On the other hand, epistemic 
conscientiousness provides a much more direct remedy to blameworthy belief; an epistemically 
conscientious believer has developed a regard for the truth which prevents them from giving into 
akrasia, and by extension a vigilance which minimizes their carelessness. 
Jason Baehr provides some insights which may help articulate this more clearly. Baehr 
regards responsibilist virtues like conscientiousness as “involving a person’s agency: to exercise 
a character virtue is, for example, to deliberate and to choose in a certain way [emphasis 
original].”106 These are contrasted with reliabilist virtues, which he notes as describing well-
functioning “input-output devices” in a much more mechanistic way.107 This recalls the 
 
105 Baehr, 193. 
106 Baehr, 197. 
107 Ibid. 
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distinction between evaluating someone as blameworthy and blaming that I made in a prior 
chapter. 
I see Baehr’s description of responsibilist and reliabilist virtues as perfectly in line with 
this distinction. Recall that in order to blame someone for violating a doxastic norm there must 
have been the opportunity for them to avoid their violation through their own agency. The fact 
that Baehr points to responsibilist virtues as engaging with one’s agency and choice shows that it 
is liable to blame proper. On the other hand, his description of reliabilist virtues as mechanistic 
and automatic shows that blame for the failure to exercise reliabilist virtues is strictly limited to 
the recognition of a norm violation, and thus irrelevant to whether a believer is responsible. To 
articulate this differently still, I regard it a much more insidious (and therefore blameworthy) act 
for one to impose harms upon their epistemic community by their own choice rather than lack of 
skill. 
To summarize, I have argued here that responsible believers are defined by their ability to 
minimize the blame they incur as the result of their beliefs; doxastic blame is appropriate when 
one generates harms in their greater epistemic community without being excused (through 
ignorance, compulsion, or inability which is not itself blameworthy). While functioning reliably 
epistemically or having epistemically flawless beliefs certainly contributes to this goal, Peels 
argument noted above makes clear that they do so only tangentially. Resistance to such cases of 
doxastic akrasia and carelessness is stymied directly only by the cultivation of epistemic 
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 The best way to encapsulate this account lies in the conclusion of the last section: a 
responsible believer is one who believes carefully, or in other words one who navigates their 
epistemic life with special attention to what the truth (and not their own interests) and their 
position within their epistemic community demands of them. Insofar as one abides by this 
maxim, they can believe blamelessly and thereby responsibly. 
 To reiterate, I arrived at this conclusion by first examining whether and when we could 
be held responsible for the beliefs which we adopt and maintain. I concluded that in virtue of the 
harms which our beliefs are capable of exposing our epistemic community to, we are nearly 
always responsible (i.e. answerable) for the beliefs we adopt and hold. Following on this, I 
examined how blame operated in doxastic contexts, concluding that practices of blaming others 
for adopting or holding incorrect beliefs was appropriate for similar reasons. The major 
limitation on such blame is the degree of control available to a believer in coming to adopt and 
hold a belief; I argued that blame directed at the formation of a belief over which a believer had 
no control (e.g. by compulsion) is incoherent and does not reflect a legitimate practice of blame. 
 In the latter chapters of this book, I applied these analyses to the examination of which 
obligations we had as believers and how we could best go about fulfilling them. I concluded that 
again, in virtue of the harms that our beliefs may generate, most of our doxastic obligations are a 
species of moral obligation and are thus more expansive and more binding than many have 
previously thought. Nevertheless, these obligations are (as noted in the discussion of blame) 
sometimes excused by a lack of control or ignorance. Crucially, from these excusing conditions I 
concluded that the true locus of doxastic blame was a variety of epistemic akrasia (or 
carelessness) wherein we recognize that an intended doxastic act violates the norms to which we 
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are beholden but choose to do it anyway. This led me to the conclusion highlighted above: the 
best means of being a responsible believer is the cultivation of epistemic care- deference to the 
truth and cognizance of one’s role and impact in their greater epistemic community. 
In these discussions, I hope to have offered some new legitimacy and perspective to our 
practices of doxastic blame. In an increasingly hostile and partisan world in which all cling 
defensively to their beliefs, it does us great justice to remember the stakes involved and harms 
imposed on others by leading epistemically vicious lives; it is important to remember that the 
price of the comfort in which we indulge by clinging to the ways of thinking familiar and easy to 
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